| Version imprimable |
Ressource documentaire
| Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory (en Anglais) | |||
Droits : Droits réservés à l'éditeur et aux auteurs Auteur(s) : Vermeule Adrian, LECAUDEY Marcel, QUENTIN Loïc Éditeur(s) : C.E.R.I.M.E.S. , COLLEGE DE FRANCE 22-05-2008 Description : La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Adrian Vermeule, Harvard Law School, 23 mai 2008Many-minds arguments are flooding into legal theory. Such arguments claim that in some way or another, many heads are better than one; the genus includes many species, such as arguments about how legal and political institutions aggregate information, evolutionary analyses of those institutions, claims about the benefits of tradition as a source of law, and analyses of the virtues and vices of deliberation.This essay offers grounds for skepticism about many-minds arguments. I provide an intellectual zoology of such arguments and suggest that they are of low utility for legal theory. Four general and recurring problems with many-minds arguments are as follows:(1) Whose minds?: The group or population whose minds are at issue is often equivocal or ill-defined.(2) Many minds, worse minds: The quality of minds is not independent of their number; rather, number endogenously influences quality, often for the worse. More minds can be systematically worse than fewer because of selection effects, incentives for epistemic free-riding, and emotional and social influences.(3) Epistemic bottlenecks: In the legal system, the epistemic benefits of many minds are often diluted or eliminated because the structure of institutions funnels decisions through an individual decisionmaker, or a small group of decisionmakers, who occupy a kind of epistemic bottleneck or chokepoint.(4) Many minds vs. many minds: The insight that many heads can be better than one gets little purchase on the institutional comparisons that pervade legal theory, which are typically many-to-many comparisons rather than one-to-many. Mots-clés libres : comportement collectif, interaction sociale, prise de décision, rationalité, sagesse | TECHNIQUE Type : image en mouvement Format : video/x-flv Source(s) : rtmp://streamer2.cerimes.fr/vod/canalu/videos/cerimes/CdF.1_14_Vermeule | ||
Entrepôt d'origine : Canal-U - OAI Archive Identifiant : oai:canal-u.fr:161396 Type de ressource : Ressource documentaire | |||
| Exporter au format XML |
Ressource pédagogique
| (en Anglais) | |||||||||
Identifiant de la fiche : 161396 Schéma de la métadonnée : LOMv1.0, LOMFRv1.0 Droits : libre de droits, gratuit Droits réservés à l'éditeur et aux auteurs Auteur(s) : VERMEULE ADRIAN Éditeur(s) : C.E.R.I.M.E.S., COLLEGE DE FRANCE, Marcel LECAUDEY, Loïc QUENTIN 22-05-2008 Mots-clés libres : comportement collectif, interaction sociale, prise de décision, rationalité, sagesse
| PEDAGOGIQUE Type pédagogique : cours / présentation Niveau : enseignement supérieur, licence TECHNIQUE Type de contenu : image en mouvement Format : video/x-flv Taille : 167.48 Mo Durée d'exécution : 1 heure 5 minutes 20 secondes RELATIONS Cette ressource fait partie de : | ||||||||
Entrepôt d'origine : Canal-U - OAI Archive Identifiant : oai:canal-u.fr:161396 Type de ressource : Ressource pédagogique | |||||||||
| Exporter au format XML |