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Competition and Cooperation (en Anglais) | |||
Droits : Droits réservés à l'éditeur et aux auteurs Auteur(s) : WOODERS Myrna, VSP - Vidéo Sud Production Éditeur(s) : Région PACA , INRIA 14-04-2011 Description : Numerous applications of economics are based on models that assume individual economic actors take prices as given. Indeed, this assumption underlies many empirical studies. The question of whether such an assumption can be justified as arising in the context of individual and group optimizing behavior has been the subject of extensive investigation.One answer to the question originates with the work of Edgeworth (1881), which argues that groups individuals cannot improve upon their part of a price-taking economic equilibrium by cooperation, that is, the set of outcomes that are stable against collective activities of groups – the core-- is equivalent to the set of price-taking equilibrium outcomes. This line of research, continued in the celebrated works of Debreu and Scarf (1963) and Aumann (1964) and in much subsequent research, treats private goods economies without externalities. Externalities, however, are common; people consume and produce in groups; individuals are affected by the presence and activities of others; individuals may enjoy being with others or they may suffer from congestion. This presentation reviews research demonstrating that for a broad class of economies, including economies with shared goods, with indivisibilities and/or non-monotonicities, with coalition production, if there are many participants in an economy then the equivalence of the core and the set of equilibrium outcomes holds. The presentation will conclude with some discussion of the latest results but some of the main papers reporting earlier results are listed below: Mots-clés libres : mathématiques économiques, mathématiques financières, recherche opérationnelle, théorie des jeux, théorie économie | TECHNIQUE Type : image en mouvement Format : video/x-flv Source(s) : rtmp://streamer2.cerimes.fr/vod/canalu/videos/fuscia/wooders_H264_240kbit_sd.mp4 | ||
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Identifiant de la fiche : 242666 Schéma de la métadonnée : LOMv1.0, LOMFRv1.0 Droits : libre de droits, gratuit Droits réservés à l'éditeur et aux auteurs Auteur(s) : WOODERS MYRNA Éditeur(s) : INRIA, Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Région PACA, INRIA, VSP - Vidéo Sud Production 14-04-2011 Mots-clés libres : mathématiques économiques, mathématiques financières, recherche opérationnelle, théorie des jeux, théorie économie
| PEDAGOGIQUE Type pédagogique : cours / présentation Niveau : enseignement supérieur, master, doctorat TECHNIQUE Type de contenu : image en mouvement Format : video/x-flv Taille : 135.01 Mo Durée d'exécution : 1 heure 1 minute 43 secondes RELATIONS Cette ressource fait partie de : | ||||||||
Entrepôt d'origine : Canal-U - OAI Archive Identifiant : oai:canal-u.fr:242666 Type de ressource : Ressource pédagogique |
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